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INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND LAW & DEVELOPMENT 
Susan D. Franck* 
 
Tom Ginsburg’s initial post raises a series of fascinating questions 
about the future of Law and Development.  These questions encourage us to 
think about the utility of different methodological approaches, basic defini-
tions, and the implications for institutional change.  Investment treaty arbi-
tration (ITA)—which gives foreign investors the right to arbitrate directly 
against a host government for arguable violations of their substantive in-
vestment right—provides a unique opportunity to explore these issues in a 
tangible manner.  So I beg your indulgence as I reflect upon a specific ap-
plication (namely, ITA) to highlight some of the themes raised by my fel-
low bloggers. 
As the legitimacy of ITA becomes a matter of heated debate, who wins 
the dispute has become a matter of particular interest.  Suggesting that ITA 
is unfairly tilted toward the developed world, various countries have with-
drawn from World Bank dispute resolution bodies or are considering the 
elimination of arbitration.13  Rather than relying on anecdotal evidence, 
supposition, or political rhetoric, it is vital to provide systematic data to aid 
stakeholders in the assessment of the ITA process and consider the implica-
tions for international development.  Ideally, a mixed-methods approach 
that both (1) capitalizes on the strengths of the individualized, sociological, 
and qualitative approaches advocated by Katharina Pistor14 and John Ohne-
sorge,15 and (2) contextualizes specific experiences within the framework of 
a larger puzzle offered by broader quantitative research, could provide par-
ticularly useful insights.16  Given the availability of data from public arbitra-
tion awards, this Essay focuses upon quantitative aspects of a mixed-
methods approach. 
Previous research has shown that although both investors and govern-
ments won investment treaty arbitration cases, the respondent states were 
more likely than investors to win (57.7% for states as compared with a 
38.5% win rate for investors).  In cases where there was a violation of the 
underlying international investment agreement (IIA), tribunals awarded 
amounts that were smaller than what investors claimed.  More particularly, 
while investors claimed an average of $343 million in damages, the average 
award was in the order of $10 million.  In sum, far more investors lost than 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law. 
13  Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Arbitration Awards, 50 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 435, 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development] (link).  
14  See Pistor, supra note 5, at 169–70. 
15  See Ohnesorge, supra note 12. 
16  See Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute 
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767 (2008) (link). 
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won, and when investors did win, they usually received far less than they 
originally claimed.17 
The open question was whether the outcomes reported were somehow 
related to variables such as the parties’ or arbitrators’ development back-
ground.  Finding the answer to this question raises an issue echoed by John 
Cioffi, namely that “large-n quantitative analyses of law related variables  
. . . [are] deeply problematic” when “these studies lump together highly de-
veloped countries” and developing countries.18  Given the possible disparate 
impact on the developing world, it is critical that research consider the dif-
ference in outcomes between these two groups.  If outcome is reliably asso-
ciated with—let alone causally influenced by—the development 
background of the respondent state or presiding arbitrator, serious questions 
about the integrity of ITA could arise. 
But even recognizing the difference between developed and develop-
ing countries raises a question: what is “development status”?  In the con-
text of quantitative research, operationalizing terms properly and 
establishing measurement validity is one of the thorniest issues.  “Devel-
opment status” can mean different things to different people in different 
contexts.  In order to benefit from standard terms and begin the process of 
creating more nuanced analysis, my own research started by using pre-
existing measures and categories for defining development.  In particular, 
the research considered “development status” in two ways, namely by ana-
lyzing categories, including: (1) membership in the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and (2) World Bank 
classification as a High Income, Upper-Middle Income, Low-Middle In-
come, or Low Income country.19 
Although this was a relatively straightforward metric for defining the 
development status of respondent states, defining the “development status” 
of arbitrators was more difficult.  Arbitrators’ development status might 
have been measured in various ways, including pure nationality of origin, 
country of residence, country of legal training, number of advanced de-
grees, membership in professional organizations, average annual income, or 
some combination thereof.  For the purposes of this initial, limited study, 
development status for arbitrators was defined as a function of arbitrator na-
tionality, in part because of the historical focus upon arbitrator nationality 
and the belief that nationality is a proxy for adjudicative neutrality.20  A pre-
siding arbitrator’s status was, therefore, measured by considering the OECD 
or World Bank classification of his/her country of origin. 
 
17  Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1, 49–50, 57–62 (2007).  Figures are in U.S. dollars. 
18  John Cioffi, Law & Development: Past Performance Is Not Indicative of Future Results, infra. 
19  Franck, Development, supra note 13, at 455.  
20  See Ilhyung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the International Arbitrator (with 
Survey Results), 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603, 613–14 (2008).  
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Bearing in mind how “development” was operationalized in this re-
search, and recognizing that different constructions may require different 
methodological approaches and definitions, the newest generation of re-
search considered whether there was a reliable statistical link between de-
velopment status and ITA outcome.21  One study considered only the impact 
of a respondent’s development status on outcome.  The results of statistical 
analyses demonstrated that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between a government’s development background and the outcome of 
ITA.22 
A second study considered the relationship among outcome, the devel-
opment status of the respondent state, and the development status of the 
presiding arbitrator’s country of origin.  The results generally showed that 
outcome was not reliably associated with the development status of the res-
pondent, the development status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interac-
tion between those two variables.  This lack of relationship held true for 
both: (1) winning or losing investment treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts 
tribunals awarded against governments.23  There were, however, two statis-
tically significant simple effects—found in one sub-set of potentially non-
representative cases24—that suggested tribunals with presiding arbitrators 
from Middle Income countries awarded different damages in cases against 
High Income countries. Specifically, if the presiding arbitrator was from a 
Middle Income country, High Income countries received statistically lower 
awards than either: (1) Upper-Middle Income respondents, or (2) Low In-
come respondents.  Awards by Middle Income presiding arbitrators for 
High Income and Lower-Middle Income respondents were statistically 
equivalent.25 
The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1) ITA is the 
equivalent of tossing a two-headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the develop-
ing world is treated unfairly in ITA, and (3) arbitrators from the developed 
and developing world decide cases differently.  The evidence creates a basis 
for cautious optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests radical over-
haul, rejection, or rebalancing of procedural rights in International Invest-
ment Agreements (IIAs) is not necessarily warranted.  Although the follow-
up tests and limitations of the data suggest optimism must be tempered 
properly, a sensible approach would involve creating targeted solutions to 
 
21  See Susan D. Franck, Considering Recalibration of International Investment Agreements: Empir-
ical Insights, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, AND 
OPTIONS (José E. Alvarez et al., eds., forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Franck, Recalibration]; Franck, 
Development, supra note 13. 
22  Franck, Recalibration, supra note 21. 
23  Franck, Development, supra note 13, at 439–40. 
24  See id. at 472 (describing the two awards and outlining reasons why the awards may be non-
representative although they shared a common presiding arbitrator). 
25  Id. 
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address particularized problems and enacting targeted reforms to redress 
perceived concerns about the international investment regime. 
In the context of ITA, Salil Mehra’s point that the “way forward for 
Law and Development [ ] involves embracing and addressing differences 
rather than seeking a universal solvent”26 buttresses this need for individua-
lized solutions.  Individualized solutions, in turn, may help address the con-
cerns raised by Mariana Prado.  It suggests that scholars can and should 
play a vital role in the Law and Development debate.  Part of that role could 
be encouraging the discourse to move beyond a dichotomy polarized by 
“unilateral blueprint” versus “context matters” models.27  In the context of 
the resolution of international investment disputes, this means encouraging 
scholars to: develop methodological insights that operate on multiple levels, 
consider different definitions of terms like “development,” recognize the 
limitations of inferences based upon specific methods and definitions, pro-
vide interpretive guidance about the policy implications, and—in light of 
those points—develop theories, subject to the research loop, that respect 
and reflect the complexities of variation within the population. 
 
26  Mehra, supra note 2, at 167. 
27  See Mariana Prado, Should We Adopt a “What Works” Approach in Law and Development?, su-
pra. 
